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Abstract
We present a game-theoretic perspective on the problems of quan-
tum state estimation and quantum cloning. This enables us to show
why the focus on universal machines and the different measures of
success, as employed in previous works, are in fact legitimite.
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The topic of quantum games is a new area of study within quan-
tum information, and its potential usefulness and consequences are
still being explored and understood [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. Early on in its de-
velopment, Meyer [1] discussed a connection between quantum games
and quantum information processing. However the majority of the
research carried out on quantum games to date, has lacked a direct
connection to quantum information processing.
In this paper, we discuss two quantum games which are of funda-
mental interest to quantum information processing and specifically to
quantum crytopgraphy: the quantum state estimation game and the
quantum cloning game. These two quantum games are no strangers to
physicists, and have been investigated extensively. However there are
still some significant questions waiting to be addressed. First: most
work in these two areas focused on universal machines, and it was typ-
ically assumed that the initial pure state to be measured or cloned had
a uniform distribution according to the corresponding unitary group.
But why are these assumptions legitimate? Second: the measure of
success in the cloning game was not unique, and researchers used dif-
ferent measures to facilitate their expositions. So why did they end up
with the same answers? The purpose of this paper is to answer these
two questions by means of a unifying game-theoretic scenario which
describes these two games.
We start with a description of the two games concerned:
Quantum state estimation game Suppose there are two players,
I and II, with a referee presiding over the game. Player II chooses an
arbitrary pure state |ψ〉 ∈ H where H = Cd. He then sends |ψ〉⊗N to
player I and |ψ〉 to the referee. Player I’s task after receiving the N
qubits from player II, is to perform a measurement on them. Based
on the outcome, player I sends a pure state |φ〉 ∈ H to the referee. For
example, if player I decides to use the set of POVM operators {Mm} to
do the measurement, and if he associates state |φm〉 to measurement
outcome m, the final state that he sends back to the referee will be∑
m tr[MmρM
†
m]|φm〉〈φm| where ρ = (|ψ〉〈ψ|)
⊗N . After receiving the
two qubits from player I and player II, the referee applies the SWAP-
test [6] on them: if the test says that the two states are equal, he
awards a payoff of 1 to player I and −1 to player II. Otherwise, player
I gets a payoff of −1 and player II a payoff of 1.
Quantum cloning game In this game, player II chooses a pure state
|ψ〉 ∈ H where H = Cd. He sends the state (|ψ〉〈ψ|)⊗N to player I
and the state (|ψ〉〈ψ|)⊗M to the referee. After receiving the state from
player II, player I designs a device that takes as input (|ψ〉〈ψ|)⊗N and
outputs a state σ such that σ is a density operator in H⊗M . He then
sends σ to the referee. Finally, the referee applies the SWAP-test on
2
(|ψ〉〈ψ|)⊗M and σ. If they pass the test, he awards a payoff of 1 to
player I and −1 to player II. Otherwise he awards −1 to player I and
1 to player II.
The above games are generalizations of the quantum games con-
sidered in Refs. [2, 5]. However, one fundamental difference from the
games of Refs. [2, 5] is that these games involve communication via
qubits. Moreover, comparing to the strategy sets discussed in Ref. [5],
we are placing a severe restriction on the players’ strategy sets. This
is justifiable because only one particular quantum operation is of in-
terest. We also note that the quantum state estimation and quantum
cloning games that we consider here, are equivalent to the games dis-
cussed in Ref. [7] and Ref. [8] respectively. The game-theoretic analysis
which follows below, however, is new.
Before deducing any general theorems for these games, we will
review some basic definitions in game theory for completeness. Further
details are given in Ref. [9]. For a vector ~v = (vi)i∈N where the k-
th entry corresponds to the k-th player’s choice of strategy, we set
~v−k to be (vi)i∈N\{k} and we denote (v1, . . . , vk−1, v
′
k, vk+1, . . . , vN ) by
(~v−k, v
′
k). We also define the set of so-called best replies for player k
to be Bk(~χ−k) := {χk ∈ Ωk : Pk(~χ−k, χk) ≥ Pk(~χ−k, χ
′
k),∀χ
′
k ∈ Ωk}
where Pk(~χ) is the payoff for the k-th player given profile ~χ. We note
that a strategy χk ∈ Bk(~χ−k) means that adopting χk renders the
optimal payoff to player k if all the other players have chosen strategies
according to the strategy profile ~χ−k. Using this notion of best reply,
we can easily define what a Nash equilibrium is: an operator profile
~χ is a Nash equilibrium if χk ∈ Bk(~χ−k) for all k.
We are now ready to state and prove two theorems for these games:
Theorem 1 For the quantum state estimation and cloning games,
max
χ∈ΩI
min
ξ∈ΩII
P (χ, ξ) = min
ξ∈ΩII
max
χ∈ΩI
P (χ, ξ) (1)
where ΩI and ΩII are the strategic sets for player I and player II re-
spectively and P (χ, ξ) is the payoff for player I.
Proof: We use the formalism developed in Ref. [5] where the same
theorem was proved. The only difference here is that we have allowed
an exchange of qubits between the two players, i.e. the payoff matrix
now has entries of the form:
tr[R(E˜ ⊗ E˜ ⊗ I︸ ︷︷ ︸
I′s operators
)(I ⊗ E˜ ⊗ E˜︸ ︷︷ ︸
II′s operators
)ρ(I ⊗ E˜† ⊗ E˜†︸ ︷︷ ︸
II′s operators
)(E˜† ⊗ E˜† ⊗ I︸ ︷︷ ︸
I′s operators
)]
with the summation indices omitted for clarity. We note that R cor-
responds to the SWAP-test by the referee. Although the overall op-
eration on the initial state is no longer a direct product of the two
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players’ strategy sets, this detail is inessential with regards the the-
orem for the following reason: once a basis for the vector space of
operators is fixed, {E˜} in this case, then all the coefficients attached
to the operators commute to the front. Hence one can see that the
resulting payoff function is again bilinear with respect to the vector
spaces of the strategy sets of the two players. Also, since we have
allowed mixed strategies for the two players, the resulting strategy
sets are convex. Compactness of the strategy sets also follows from a
similar discussion in Ref. [5]. We can therefore deduce the theorem by
invoking the Minmax theorem of Ref. [10] because the strategy sets
are compact and convex, and P (χ, ξ) is linear and continuous in χ and
ξ. Q.E.D.
The above proof is almost identical to the classical version, but one
should note that the two players’ strategy spaces no longer form a
direct product of operator spaces.
The next theorem is more general than we need and it highlights
the similarity of the quantum state estimation and quantum cloning
games. In fact, the same proof shows that in the well-known children’s
game of rock-paper-scissors, the best strategy is to adopt the three
options with uniform probability.
Theorem 2 Consider a two-player zero-sum game with pure strategy
sets ΩI and ΩII for players I and II respectively, such that the Min-
max theorem applies. Suppose that ΩII is a compact topological group
with the property that for each e ∈ ΩI, there is an ef ′ ∈ ΩI such that
the payoff P (ef ′ , f) = P (e, f
′f) for all f ∈ ΩII. Then the strategy ξ
∗
which corresponds to adopting a specific strategy with uniform proba-
bility with respect to the unique Haar measure, is a strategy at a Nash
equilbrium for player II.
Proof: We let χ∗ ∈ BI(ξ
∗) where BI(ξ
∗) is the set of best replies of
player I with respect to ξ∗. χ∗ can be represented by the probabil-
ity ensemble {Q(e)de, e} where Q(e)de is the probability for choosing
the pure strategy e. We now define χ¯∗ to be the probability ensem-
ble {Q(e) de df ′, ef ′} where df
′ is a uniform probability distribution
corresponding to the Haar measure of ΩII. Then
P (χ¯∗, ξ∗) =
∫
de df df ′ Q(e)P (ef ′ , f) (2)
=
∫
de df df ′ Q(e)P (e, f ′f) (3)
=
∫
de df Q(e)P (e, f) (4)
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= P (χ∗, ξ∗). (5)
Hence, χ¯∗ is also inBI(ξ
∗) but with the extra property that P (χ¯∗, f ′) =
P (χ¯∗, f ′′) for all f ′, f ′′ ∈ ΩII. Borrowing the terminology from the
cloning literature, we call χ¯∗ universal. Now, suppose ξ∗ is not at a
Nash equilibrium but ξˆ is (its existence is guaranteed by the Minmax
theorem). Then
P (χ¯∗, ξˆ) < P (χ¯∗, ξ∗).
However this is impossible because ξˆ is itself a probability ensemble
of ΩII. The theorem therefore follows. Q.E.D.
We can also deduce the following corollary from the above theorem:
Corollary 3 Consider a game as depicted in Theorem 2. Any uni-
versal strategy χ¯∗, such that P (χ¯∗, ξ∗) is optimal and where ξ∗ is the
same strategy as defined in Theorem 2, is therefore at a Nash equilib-
rium. Q.E.D.
The quantum state estimation and quantum cloning games fall
within the realm of the previous theorems. We are therefore ready to
discuss the two questions we set out to answer. First: the assumption
of having an initial pure state distributed with uniform probability,
is legitimate because this corresponds to a strategy at Nash equilib-
rium for player II. Subsequently, optimizing the estimation or cloning
operation with respect to this strategy gives us the value of the corre-
sponding game. Furthermore, if the resulting operation is universal,
then the operations are themselves guaranteed to be at Nash equilib-
rium using the above corollary. The reason why Werner obtained an
identical result [8] to Gisin and Massar [11], despite the fact that they
adopted different measures of success, is as follows: the quantity Gisin
and Massar identified for optimization (with χ ∈ ΩI) was
P (χ, ξ∗), (6)
while that of Werner was
inf
ξ∈Ξ
P (χ, ξ) (7)
where Ξ is the set of strategies whereby player II can only choose
one particular pure state rather than a probabilistic mixture of many.
Hence using Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, we can see that the bound that
they arrived at is actually the value of the cloning game. Furthermore,
since Werner’s optimization was with respect to all unitary states, the
operation found is guaranteed to be at Nash equilibrium by Theorem 1.
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On the other hand, since the operation found by Gisin and Massar is
universal, it is also at Nash equilibrium due to Theorem 2.
For completeness, we now give the Nash equilibria for the quantum
state estimation and quantum cloning games:
The quantum state estimation game with N initial qubits has
a Nash equilibrium (χ∗, ξ∗) where χ∗ corresponds to the following
strategy:
1. Measure the initial set of qubits with the set of measurement
operators
{∑
m,n cre
−iψr(m−n)d
N/2
m,N/2(θr)d
N/2
n,N/2(θr)|m〉〈n|
}
, 1 ≤
r ≤ N + 1 where the cr’s are such that∑
r
cre
−iψr(m−n)d
N/2
m,N/2(θr)d
N/2
n,N/2(θr) = δm,n . (8)
Here |m〉 is short-hand for |N2 ,m〉 with the principal axis adopted
with uniform probability according to the corresponding unitary
group, and with d
N/2
m,N/2(θ) being the rotation operator of a spin-
N/2 particle [12].
2. Upon measurement s, submit to the referee the qubit |φs〉 where
|φs〉
⊗N =
∑
m e
−iψsmd
N/2
m,N/2(θs)|m〉.
For player II, ξ∗ corresponds to adopting a pure state with uniform
probability with respect to the Haar measure of the unitary group.
The value of the game is N+1N+2 .
The N 7→ M quantum cloning game in a d-dimensional Hilbert
space has a Nash equilibrium (χ∗, ξ∗) where χ∗ corresponds to the
mapping [8]:
ρ 7→
d[N ]
d[M ]
sM (ρ⊗ 1
⊗(M−N))sM . (9)
Here sM is the orthogonal projection of H
M onto its Bose space and
ξ∗ corresponds to adopting a pure state with uniform probability with
respect to the Haar measure of the unitary group. The value of the
game is d[N ]/d[M ] where d[N ] =
(
d+N − 1
N
)
.
Although we have only succeeded in finding one particular strategy
profile at Nash equilibrium, this is in fact sufficient as far as playing
the game is concerned due to the following theorem:
Theorem 4 In a two-player zero-sum game, let (χ1, ξ1) and (χ2, ξ2)
be two equilibrium pairs. Then
1. (χ1, ξ2) and (χ2, ξ1) are also equilibrium pairs, and
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2. P (χ1, ξ1) = P (χ2, ξ2) = P (χ1, ξ2) = P (χ2, ξ1).
Proof: The proof can be found in Ref. [13]. Q.E.D.
In contrast to general games where one should worry about multiple
Nash equilibria, a strategy at equilibrium is as good as any other in a
two-player zero-sum game. Therefore, finding one such equilibrium is
enough.
We note that there is, in fact, more than one version of a quantum
cloning game: these versions differ according to how the referee deter-
mines the payoffs. For example, the referee may perform a one-particle
test or multiple-particle test on the qubits he/she receives. However
it turns out that the strategies at the Nash equilibrium are equiva-
lent [8, 14]. Unfortunately, their equivalence cannot be deduced from
game-theoretic arguments since the payoff vectors R differ for these
two games, and consequently they are distinct in the game-theoretic
formalism. However, we can in fact deduce a bound on asymmetric
cloning from the Minmax theorem by considering the one-particle-test
game. In this game, the referee is going to apply the SWAP-test on
|ψ〉〈ψ|, which is sent by player II, together with a reduced density ma-
trix σ ∈ H obtained by tracing out all but the k-th Hilbert space H
where k is chosen by player II. In a similar way to the above argument,
one can see that Keyl and Werner have shown that the mapping in
Eq. 9 is the strategy at Nash equilibrium, and the value of a N 7→M
cloning game is N(d+M)+M−N(d+N)M . Hence if there exists an asymmetric
cloner such that the sum of the fidelity of the M output states with
respect to the original input state is greater than N(d+M)+M−N(d+N) , then
it will violate Theorem 1. Therefore given a N 7→M cloner, the sum
of the fidelity of the M output states with respect to the original input
state is less than or equal to
N(d+M)+M−N
(d+N) = N+O(1/d). This bound
thus limits the flow of information from one system to another. We
note that the above bound on asymmetric cloning is also implicit in
Ref. [11]: however in that work the authors proceeded by symmetriz-
ing the asymmetric cloning machine.
In summary we have discussed the problems of quantum state es-
timation and cloning using a game-theoretic perspective, and have
found the corresponding Nash equilibria. We also justified the focus
to date on universal machines, and the different measures of success
employed. The fact that the theorems that we deduced are more gen-
eral than we needed, implies that they have potential use in other
adversary-type scenarios. We also note that although we have re-
stricted the referee’s action to be physical, hence rendering some situ-
ations impossible [15], this need not be the case. In fact, the Minmax
theorem holds as long as the payoff function is rendered linear with re-
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spect to χ and ξ. We conclude by noting that it is well-known among
computer scientists that bounds on classical computing can be proved
by classical game-theoretic techniques [16]. So could quantum games
pay back this debt by passing similar benefits back over to quantum
computation? The answer awaits further investigation.
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